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Different Types of Participation in Constitution Making Processes: Towards a 
Conceptualisation 
 
Abrak Saati 
 
(Umeå University, Sweden) 
 
 
Though participatory constitution making processes in post-conflict states and in states 
transitioning from authoritarian rule have become a new trend, scholarly research has yet to 
approach the notion of participation in a sharp and distinct way. In this article, I develop a novel 
approach for differentiating participation in constitution making, depending on the extent of 
influence that participants are granted, illustrating this reasoning with eight empirical cases from 
the African continent.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the dawn of the peacebuilding era, scholars of constitutional design have observed 
that a new norm, or at least a new ‘best practices’ standard, has developed with regard to 
the design of constitution making processes in post-conflict states and in states 
transitioning from authoritarian rule. This new standard puts ordinary women and men at 
the front and center of the making of their founding laws and it has developed into a 
peacebuilding strategy because of a number of perceived beneficial effects, not least 
because it is held to promote democracy and lead to sustainable peace. The emphasis on 
broad based public participation, nevertheless, challenges the customary way through 
which constitutions have traditionally been produced. To be sure, as noted by Arato 
(2000), Hart (2010) and Tully (1995), constitution making has for a long time been an area 
strictly reserved for political elites and lawyers. A normative change has, however, been 
accompanied by new policy standards enthusiastically promoted by international 
organisations and individual scholars (e.g. Ghai and Galli, 2006; Samuels, 2006; Banks, 
2007; Wing, 2008). Hence, traditional methods of arriving at a final document have had to 
give way to the new trend of public involvement in constitution making. 
Though public engagement in constitution making in post-conflict states and in 
states transitioning from authoritarian rule has increased since the 1990s, up to the point 
that the term ‘participatory constitution making’ is by now commonplace (Ginsburg et al., 
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2009; Brandt et al., 2011), scholarly research has yet to approach the concept of 
‘participation’ in an analytically sharp and distinct way. In fact, as things stand today, 
different cases are being lumped together and designated a general label of being examples 
of participatory constitution making, in turn indicating that the participation of the people 
has been uniform with the same extent of influence in all cases. This is, however, quite far 
from the truth, and addressing what participation implies, how it can be distinguished and 
hence operationalised, is necessary for two distinct reasons. To begin with, if public 
participation in constitution making is going to be promoted as a policy, then those who are 
issuing this policy have an undeniable interest in understanding how participation can take 
different forms with different amounts of influence for participants. Second, a greater 
understanding of what participation in constitution making actually entails and how 
different types of participation can be differentiated from each other in a systematic way 
provides necessary knowledge for future research projects that may wish to focus on 
analysing the effects of participation in constitution making on different outcomes of 
interest (e.g. democracy, legitimacy, reconciliation, etc.).  
In this article, my focus is on the conceptualisation and differentiation of public 
participation in constitution making. This is an important contribution because when it 
comes to differentiating participatory constitution making processes based on how 
participation has taken form, there is no previous research to lean on. Therefore, in the first 
part of the article, I engage in a novel approach of developing an analytical framework for 
analysing public participation in constitution making and a new typology of participation in 
such processes specifically. Depending on a) who the initiators of the constitution making 
process are; b) how the forms of communication with the public are constructed; c) how 
inclusive the process is; and d) where final authority over the constitutional document is 
vested, it is possible to categorise cases as different types of participation, namely: false, 
symbolic, limited, consultative or substantial participation. I then use this analytical 
framework to categorise eight African cases that are commonly (and uniformly) referred to 
as ‘participatory processes’ in order to illustrate that public participation in constitution 
making has indeed varied extensively across cases with very different extents of influence 
over the constitutional content for participants. The eight empirical cases are: Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  
When it comes to the method for constructing the analytical framework, it should be 
noted that it is developed by using a combination of deductive and inductive analysis. In 
practice this means that I have moved back and forth between theory and the empirical 
material, which consists of an original set of twenty participatory constitution making 
processes that have been carried out in different parts of the world (Saati, 2015). An 
inductive-deductive approach has been chosen because although the written works of 
classical participation theorists – particularly the scholarly contributions of Pateman 
(1970) and Arnstein (1969) – are valuable since they acknowledge that participation can 
take different forms and because they provide some theoretical guidance for developing a 
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typology of participation that is specific for constitution making, they also share a 
weakness. Existing categorisations and typologies of participation fail to be specific as to 
what exactly makes a specific case of participation an example of a specific type. In order to 
be as explicit as possible, the study presented here has found it critical to also allow the 
typology to be influenced by the empirical material. Hence, my typology of false, symbolic, 
limited, consultative and substantial types of participation in constitution making sets out 
to be as detailed as possible concerning why a specific case of participation is categorised 
as a specific type.  
 
2. Public Participation in Constitution Making: Towards a Conceptualisation 
 
When it comes to public participation in constitution making, the lack of definitional clarity 
in present scholarly work has caused some confusion, in so far as it has led many to 
construe more participation as an issue of quantity. In a sense, this is a view that the more 
people that have been involved in a constitution making process, the more participatory 
the process has been. It is for example not at all uncommon, rather the contrary, that 
reference is made to the number of constitutional submissions that have been received by 
the people in a given process and the number of public hearings that have been held (e.g. 
Rosenn, 2010; Thier, 2010; Ebrahim and Miller, 2010) as an indication of how participatory 
a constitution making process has been. It is important to note, however, that even if a 
considerable number of individuals participate in their country’s constitution making 
process, this does not reveal whether or not their participation has had an effect on the 
constitutional content or whether or not the constitutional draft enters into force. Hence, in 
order to be able to define ‘participation’, a first step is to acknowledge that participation in 
constitution making is in fact a political form of participation and as such entails the core 
notion of influence. To be clear, this study accepts the view that the concept of participation 
includes the degree of influence participants have over decisions being made in relation to 
the constitutional document – both in terms of its content and in terms of its adoption. To 
capture the degree of influence is, in turn, not easily done by the use of quantitative 
measures – rather a qualitative approach is required. In the next part of this section, I move 
on to present and discuss four factors that determine the extent of influence that 
participants are granted in a given constitution making process.2  
 
2.1 The Initiators of the Process  
 
The first factor that impacts the extent of influence that the public is allowed during a 
constitution making process concerns the initiators of the process. The agents who decide 
that constitutional reform should be undertaken and who also determine the rules of 
                                                          
2 These four factors are elaborated in much fuller detail in Saati (2015). 
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procedure that will guide the reform process, undoubtedly have the opportunity to design 
the process to encourage/discourage participation in a manner that results in influence for 
participants. As regards the agents of constitutional reform in post-conflict states and in 
states transitioning from authoritarian rule, an initial distinction can be made between 
initiators who are ‘outsiders’ (international and regional actors as well as individual 
states), and those who are ‘insiders’ (national actors). These two broader categories can be 
further differentiated into different types. When it comes to the ‘outsiders’, we on the one 
hand have actors who influence the actual content of the constitution, and on the other 
hand, actors who determine how the constitution making process will be carried out (but 
without getting themselves involved in formulating content). Without a doubt, between the 
two types, the first is more influential since authority over constitutional content rests with 
outsiders, rather than with national elites and even less so with ordinary citizens. ‘Insiders’ 
as agents of constitutional reform are just as the outsiders, a heterogeneous group of 
people and/or organisations whose motives for constitutional reform originate from 
different goals and purposes. On a general level, three different types of inside initiators 
can be discerned: national elites (political or military), civil society organisations or a 
broad array of national actors who jointly agree that constitutional reform is desirable. To 
sum up: the first of four factors that can be used to determine the degree of influence for 
participants in a constitution making process relates to the issue of agency and the 
actor/actors resolve (or lack of resolve) to allow the public to influence the content of the 
constitution.  
 
2.2 The Forms of Communication  
 
The second aspect that has a bearing on how the people can participate in the constitution 
making process, and thereby try to exert influence, concerns the forms of communication. 
The subject under consideration is: how is the process being communicated to the public 
and how (if at all) is the public called upon to actively participate? In constitution making 
processes, forms of communication can generally take one of four different modes. The first 
is a one-way model of communication in which the initiators of the process are primarily 
interested in keeping the people informed about the constitution making process, but 
without allowing them to influence the document. Channels for feedback from the public 
are hence shut. The second mode is a two-way model of communication, which signals that 
communication channels are at least open in both directions. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that participants are guaranteed influence, since those who are tasked 
with the actual drafting of the constitution might not be legally compelled to consider and 
include the feedback into the draft. The third approach is a two-way model of 
communication with integrated proactive measures. This communication plan is used by 
initiators of the process who are sincerely interested in listening to the opinions of the 
people on constitutional subjects. In response, different mechanisms are put in practice 
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during the course of the constitution making process that serve to enable the people’s 
participation and to make it possible for them to provide feedback. An example of such a 
proactive initiative is to carry out constitutional education programmes prior to asking the 
public about their views on various constitutional proposals. The fourth mode is that of 
consultation. When the form of communication is that of consultation, the 
comprehensiveness of the communication strategy is even more elaborate than in the third 
approach. The communication scheme involves mechanisms for systematically reviewing 
the comments of the people in order to facilitate the gathering of additional opinions from 
them as regards specific suggestions, etc. As part of a more exhaustive communication 
strategy, constitutional education programmes are also carried out on a nationwide scale 
and constructed so as to be adaptable for people with varying degrees of previous 
knowledge concerning constitutional issues.  
 
2.3 The Degree of Inclusion  
 
For purposes of making a fair assessment of how participatory a constitution making 
process has been, the third factor that must be considered is the degree of inclusion. When 
it comes to this aspect specifically, we want to understand if all groups in society have been 
invited to participate or if some have been disqualified from making their voices heard, as 
well as whether invited groups have voluntarily chosen not to participate. While inclusion 
in and by itself does not equal influence, it is nonetheless an important aspect to take into 
account, because if some groups are banned from participating and/or some groups 
boycott the process then this impacts of the public’s overall degree of influence on the 
content of the constitution. On a general level, the scope of inclusion in constitution making 
can take three different expressions. The first is that some groups/political parties are 
forbidden to participate. The second is that participation is an option made available for all 
groups/political parties in a country, some of whom, by choice, refrain from using their 
right to engage. The third is a constitution making process in which all groups/political 
parties are welcome to participate, and all groups interested in engaging do so.  
 
2.4 The Question of Final Authority  
 
The last factor that is also important to consider when assessing how participatory a 
constitution making process is, concerns the question of final authority. Although voting 
may be considered an insufficient form of participation, if one construes participation to 
hold deeper meaning than to merely vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on a political package of 
constitutional provisions, it is still a manifestation of public influence, and particularly so if 
approval via referendum is decisive for the adoption of a draft constitution. When it comes 
to constitution making processes specifically, the question of final authority can generally 
take three different expressions. Sometimes final authority over the document is vested in 
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the hands of an appointed or executive body whereas in other cases, final authority is 
indirectly vested in the hands of the people through, for example, a popularly elected 
constitutional assembly. Final authority may also be vested directly in the hands of the 
people through a referendum.  
 
To summarise: there are four main factors that can be used to determine the extent of 
influence for participants in a constitution making process. These have been briefly 
discussed in this section. Table 1 illustrates how different combinations of these factors 
give rise to different types of participation, namely: false, symbolic, limited, consultative 
and substantial. This typology is the first of its kind to be developed for the sole purpose of 
distinguishing different types of participation in constitution making processes from each 
other and it is an important contribution because it aims to demonstrate that there are 
indeed vast differences between various forms of participation in constitution making. It 
should be noted that moving from false to substantial (from the far left to the right of the 
table) signals an increasing level of influence for participants. In the final row of the table, 
the eight empirical cases are categorised into the participation type that best reflects the 
extent of participation in that specific constitution making process. Of course, it is worth 
emphasising that all of these cases are unique as regards the circumstances that led up to 
the process and the exact procedures that were employed during the course of it. 
Consequently, some cases are more difficult to classify as a specific type of participation 
than others. Nevertheless, based on thorough and systematic research (Saati, 2015), the 
four factors and how they play out in each of the cases give a good indication as to how 
public participation in constitution making has taken form and with what degree of 
influence for participants. 
  
Saati, ‘Participation in Constitution Making Processes’ 
 
 24 
Table 1. Typology of Different Forms of Participation in Constitution Making  
 
 False 
participation 
Symbolic 
participation 
Limited 
participation 
Consultative 
participation 
Substantial 
participation 
Initiators of the 
process 
Outside actor 
(determines the 
content of the 
constitution or 
the process) 
Outside actor 
(determines the 
constitution 
making 
process), or 
different types 
of inside actors  
National elites 
(political or 
military) 
National elites 
(political or 
military) 
Civil society 
organisations, 
or broad array 
of national 
actors  
Forms of 
communication 
One-way model 
of 
communication 
One-way model 
of 
communication 
Two-way model 
of 
communication, 
or two-way 
model of 
communication 
with integrated 
proactive 
measures 
Two-way 
model of 
communication 
with integrated 
proactive 
measures/ 
Consultation  
Two-way 
model of 
communication 
with integrated 
proactive 
measures/ 
Consultation 
 
Degree of 
inclusion 
Certain groups 
banned from 
participation 
All segments of 
the population/ 
political parties 
allowed to 
participate, but 
some choose to 
boycott the 
process 
All segments of 
the population/ 
political parties 
allowed to 
participate, but 
some choose to 
boycott the 
process 
All segments of 
the population/ 
political parties 
allowed to 
participate, and 
all interested in 
doing so 
participate 
All segments of 
the population/ 
political parties 
allowed to 
participate, but 
some choose to 
boycott the 
process/ 
All segments of 
the population/ 
political parties 
allowed to 
participate, and 
all participate 
Final authority  Final authority 
rests with the 
executive or 
indirectly in the 
hands of the 
public  
Final authority 
rests with the 
executive or 
indirectly in the 
hands of the 
public 
Final authority 
indirectly 
vested in the 
hands of the 
people  
Final authority 
indirectly 
vested in the 
hands of the 
people  
Final authority 
directly vested 
in the hands of 
the people 
through a 
referendum  
 Empirical 
case(s): 
Nigeria  
Empirical 
case(s): 
- 
Empirical 
case(s): 
Rwanda, 
Uganda, 
Ethiopia 
Empirical 
case(s):  
South Africa, 
Eritrea  
Empirical 
case(s): 
Kenya, 
Zimbabwe  
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3. Discussing the Categorisation of Two Empirical Cases 
 
It is worthwhile to briefly elaborate the discussion through a few empirical cases that we 
find in Table 1 in order for the classification to become clearer. I will in this section, 
therefore, devote attention to the cases of Nigeria and Uganda.3 When elaborating on these 
cases, the discussion will follow the structure that we find in the column to the left in Table 
1. 
 
3.1 Nigeria  
 
The 1999 constitution making process of Nigeria was initiated by the military. As regards 
the forms of communication, a time span of two months to finalise the process made it 
nearly impossible to include Nigeria’s large population of 115 million4 people in the making 
of the constitution. Furthermore, judging from the set-up of the process it appears as 
though the Nigerian military was interested in soliciting the views of the public only if they 
expressed support for a strong military branch and not otherwise (Jega, 2000). In terms of 
degree of inclusion, the CDCC (Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee) did not 
engage the Nigerian opposition: the National Democratic Coalition, the United Action for 
Democracy and the Joint Action Committee of Nigeria, for example, were not consulted. The 
opposition was rather completely sidestepped in the making of the constitution 
(Ihonvbere, 2000). Lastly, when it comes to the question of final authority with regards to 
the adoption of the draft constitution, this was vested in the hands of the executive without 
any public influence at all. Hence, when taking all of these factors into account, the 1999 
Nigerian constitution building process did not produce participation that resulted in actual 
influence for participants. This explains why it is categorised as an example of false 
participation in Table 1.  
 
3.2 Uganda 
 
Immediately after it gained power, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government 
in Uganda declared that the country would embark on a constitution making process that 
would produce a new constitution made by the people of Uganda. As to the forms of 
communication, a 21-member Constitutional Commission was established to review the 
old constitution and prepare a new one. The commissions agreed that it was vitally 
important that the Ugandan people be the main agenda setters for the new document. 
Therefore, the Commission organised seminars throughout all 34 districts of the country in 
                                                          
3 For further details and discussion about the categorisation of all empirical cases in Table 1, see Saati (2015). 
4 1999 estimation. 
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order to develop a constitutional agenda that was based on the input of the people. Over 
the course of an entire year, constitutional education programmes were carried out on a 
nationwide scale, in all of Uganda’s 890 sub-counties, constitutional materials were 
disseminated. After that, for another full year, constitutional submissions were gathered 
from the public in all parts of the country. However, the degree to which the popularly 
derived constitutional provisions are actually reflected in the document is difficult to 
establish. It has been argued that although the magnitude of public participation in the 
process was extensive, the public’s input had little real impact on the substance of the 
document and the ruling elites’ main purpose in involving the citizens was to give the 
constitution a ‘shimmer’ of legitimacy (Tripp, 2010). Nevertheless, in terms of involving 
and preparing the Ugandans to participate in the process, the constitution making process 
in Uganda was successful (Waliggo, 2001; Wapakhabulo, 2001; Mugwanya, 2001). At the 
same time, regarding the degree of inclusion, the Ugandan process was not fully inclusive. 
Although politicians could engage in the process in their capacity as Ugandan citizens, they 
were not allowed to engage as representatives of a political party, because political parties 
as such were banned from participation (Tripp, 2010). When it comes to the question of 
final authority over the constitution, this was not directly vested in the hands of the people, 
but indirectly so. The Ugandans voted for members of a Constitutional Assembly who, in 
turn, voted on the final document. The combination of these factors explains why Uganda 
has been categorised as an example of limited participation in Table 1.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The analytical framework for differentiating participatory constitution making processes 
into different types of participation, depending on how much influence participants have 
been granted, helps us approach this area of research in an analytically sharp and distinct 
way. This is a novel approach that seeks to be of value for future research projects that set 
out to both understand the extent of influence for participants in individual cases of 
constitution making, as well as to analyse whether certain types of participation affect 
various outcomes of interest in different ways. Indeed, as we move forth and aspire to 
increase our knowledge about participatory constitution making in post-conflict states and 
in states under transition from authoritarian rule, the outcomes of these processes at an 
individual as well as on a macro-level of analysis are an intriguing area of research waiting 
to be explored.   
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